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1 Introduction
Web-based third-party architectures for data publishing
are today receiving growing attention, due to their scalabil-
ity and the ability of efÞciently managing large numbers of
users and great amounts of data. A third-party architecture
relies on a distinction between the data Owner, i.e., the pro-
ducer of information, and the Publisher that provides data
management services and query procesing functions for (a
portion of) the OwnerÕs information. Clearly, in such an
architecture security is a primary challenge. Main security
propertiesthat should be consideredare: conÞdentiality,in-
tegrity,a n dauthenticity. Additionally to these traditional
security requirements, we are interested in a further secu-
rity property, that is, completeness. By completeness we
mean that the user receiving a portion of data can verify
whether he/she has received all the information is allowed
to see accordingto thespeciÞed accesscontrolpolicies. Re-
quiringPublishersto betrusted wrtthese securityproperties
is not an appropriate solution in that large web-based sys-
temscannotbe easily veriÞedtobe trustedand canbe easily
penetrated. Thus, our goal is to ensure security properties
evenin the presenceof an untrustedPublisher. Inthis paper,
we propose a comprehensive framework for a secure third
partydistributionofXMLdata. Inparticular,theframework
is able to enforce all the above-mentioned properties, by
exploiting encryption and non-conventional signature tech-
niques.
Our work has been greatly inspired by the work by
Hacigumus et al. [3], which develop an interesting method
for querying encrypted data stored in relational databases
thusensuringconÞdentialityrequirements. Fromsuchwork
weborrowthemethodforqueryingencrypteddata,whichis
based on partitioning the domains of the relation attributes.
However, such work only considers conÞdentiality wrt the
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Publisher, whereas they do not consider conÞdentiality wrt
user, in that they do not ensure the Owner that its data
are only disclosed to users authorized according to the ac-
cess control policies it speciÞes, nor it considers authen-
ticity/integrity and completeness. Related work is the one
by Miklau and Suciu [4] which proposed a method for a
controlled sharing of XML data, dealing only with conÞ-
dentiality issues. As in our approach, conÞdentiality is en-
sured by the use of cryptographic techniques. However, the
main difference with our proposal is that they do not rely
on a Publisher for managing data, rather the data are simply
published on the web in an encrypted form and each user
can access the authorized portions, using the keys he/she
receives from the data Owner. However, we strongly be-
lieve that relying on a data Publisher has many beneÞts,
in terms of efÞciency and optimization of resource usage.
Simply publishing the data over the web would make them
the target of a huge number of attacks, with many users try-
ing to perform queries over them, and thus consuming a
huge amount of computational resources. By contrast, the
Publisher can be equipped with sophisticated anti-intrusion
tools and techniques avoiding queries ßoods. Additionally,
not relying on a Publisher requires each user be equipped
with a query engine able to process queries over encrypted
contents.
2 Overview of the proposed framework
In our framework, before sending a document to a Pub-
lisher the Owner encrypts it. In particular, all the portions
of the document that are protected by the same policies are
encrypted with the same symmetric key. To make the Pub-
lisher able to answer user queries according to the speciÞed
access control policies and without the need of decrypting
the Owner data, the Owner sends it some additional infor-
mation. First of all, it sends the Publisher information on
which access control policies apply on the managed docu-
ments. Additionally, the Owner sends the Publisher some
information that makes it able to query encrypted data. The
basic idea is that the Owner dividesthe domainof each doc-
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partitions, to which it assigns a unique id. Then, the Owner
sends the Publisher together with the encrypted node also
the id of the partition corresponding to its value. The Pub-
lisher is thus able to perform queries directly on the en-
crypted documents, by exploiting the partitioning ids. Ac-
cording to this approach, the Publisher is able to evaluate
user queries on encrypted data, and to return to the user
the corresponding encrypted view. Then, in order to make
a user able to access the encrypted result, the Owner sup-
plies him/her during a mandatory subscription phase with
the appropriate encryption keys. More precisely, during
this phase, the Owner assigns to a user one or more cre-
dentials.1 Thus, as a result of the subscription phase, the
Owner returns the user the keys corresponding to the por-
tions of the source he/she is entitled to access and a user
policy conÞguration, containing information on the access
control policies the user satisÞes. The user policy conÞgu-
ration is signed with the private key of the Owner, to pre-
vent a user from altering its content, and it is submitted by
the user to the Publisher along with a query. In this way, the
Publisherknowswhichportionsoftherequesteddocuments
the user is allowed to access. Authenticity and integrity are
assuredb yt h eu s eo fM e r k l eSignatures [1], that is, sig-
natures generated by the Owner using a bottom-up compu-
tation on the whole documents, which exploit Merkle hash
trees. Such signatureis generatedbeforeencryptinga docu-
mentanditisthussenttothePublisheralongwiththecorre-
sponding document. The Publisher will then forward it to a
user querying the document to which it refers to. The prob-
lem here is that, since the Publisher answer may not contain
all the document portions over which the signature is com-
puted, because of the access control policies speciÞed by
the Owner, a user may not be able to validate the signature.
To avoid this shortcoming, the Owner sends the Publisher
a set of additional hash values, one for each node, which
represent the information needed to validate the signature
if the corresponding node is not inserted into the Publisher
answer. Thus, when a user queries a certain document, the
Publisher sends him/her, besides the corresponding Merkle
signature, also some additional hash values referring to the
document portions not contained in the query answer. This
makes the user able to locally perform the computation of
the Merkle signature and comparing it with the one gener-
ated by the Owner.
All additional information required by the Publisher for
conÞdentiality and authenticity/integrity enforcement are
encoded in XML and attached to the encrypted document,
forming the so called security enhanced encryption of the
original document. Similarly, all information needed by
a user to prove the satisfaction of the considered security
1Alternatively, credentials and/or keys can be managed by a trusted
third-party Authority.
properties are encoded by the Publisher in XML and at-
tached to the query answer, resulting in what we call the
reply document. Moreover, to make a user able to ver-
ify the completeness of a query result, the Þrst time the
user submits a query to a new document, the Publisher re-
turns him/her an additional XML document, called query
template, for the requested document. The query template
is generated directly by the Owner, and basically contains
only the structure of the original document, encrypted by
the Owner using the same strategy employedfor XML doc-
uments. The query template has the twofold goal of making
a user able to verify the completeness of the received an-
swers, and to make easier the task of query submission, in
that by inspecting the query template a user can obtain in-
formation on the structure of the documents (or portions)
he/she is allowed to access. Note that the approachwe have
devised requires that some additionalinformation are trans-
mitted by the Owner to both the Publishers and the users.
In particular, the Owner should deliver to users all the nec-
essary keys. To reduce the overhead of these operations
require, we assume that all such information are stored by
the Ownerinto a directory(which canalso beshared among
differentOwners belongingto the same domain or to feder-
ated ones). Each user/Publisher receives by the Owner only
one key, to be used to access its entry in the directory.2
In the extend version of the paper [2] besides providing
a formal foundation for the proposed infrastructure and the
detailsofsecuritypropertyenforcementwe proveits sound-
ness.
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